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Mar., 1952
FORMS COMMITTEE PRESENTS STANDARD
PLEADING SAMPLES TO BE USED IN
DIVORCE LITIGATION
The Forms Committee submits herewith standard pleading
samples for use in divorce litigation. Separate maintenance ac-
tions would use almost the same forms. It is realized that all of
the possible types of motions and orders cannot feasibly be pre-
sented in any one article; so only those causing the most trouble
-and, therefore, the most controversial-are offered. Suggestions
for improvement of these forms are urgently requested, and if
there are other forms desired, the Committee shall attempt to
draft them and publish the same at a later date.
FORMS STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE,
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, Chairman,
SUB-COMMITTEE ON DISTRICT COURT FORMS,
DONALD M. LESHER, Chairman.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER AND
STATE OF COLORADO




REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN, DIVORCE
Defendant.f
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Raton, New
Mexico, the first day of April, 1948; plaintiff has been a bona fide
resident and citizen of Colorado during the year next prior to
the commencement of this action, and plaintiff and defendant
presently reside in the City and County of Denver.'
2. The parties have two children:
Name Date of Birth
Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwmn August 15, 1948
Alfonso Grthvlm Hpuiwmn December 25, 1951
Plaintiff desires their custody.
3. Defendant has been extremely and repeatedly cruel toward
plaintiff, such cruelty consisting of the infliction of mental suffer-
ing and bodily violence committed in the State of Colorado. 2
Wa 14 F A/
'Inapplicable if not a resident that long onleg sought on ground of
adultry or extreme cruelty committed in Colorado. If action is brought in
county where defendant last resided, so state. (See Sec. 6, Ch. 56.)
' If other grounds, insert (see Chapter 56, Secs. 1 and 2).
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4. Defendant has income sufficient to support plaintiff and
the minor children, and to pay the costs and expenses of this
action, and to pay the obligations of the parties.
3
5. The parties own real property described as Lots 1 and 2,
Block 1, Dousthul Heights, City and County of Denver, Colorado,
and certain personal property, which should be divided between
them.
4
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a divorce, custody of the
minor children, alimony, support for the children, a division of
property, attorney fees and costs, and for such other and further
relief as to the Court may seem proper.5
Plaintiff's Address: Silvester Hasede6
11 Waan Avenue, Attorney for Plaintiff
Denver 6, Colorado. 1st Majestic-Equitable Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado, DYbryt 004U.
The Summons is omitted, because it is a routine form (see
Form 1, App. A, Vol. 1, C.S.A.). If complaint is served with it,
the Denver District Court form of summons may be completed
by adding at the end where it states "This is an action," the words
"in divorce." If complaint is served later, the grounds should
be typed in also, although the Committee takes no position as to
the necessity of this.
If the summons is accepted voluntarily, a suggested form
for acceptance of service is the following affidavit, to be typed
on the reverse side of the summons.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERJSS"
I, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, being duly sworn, state that
I am of full age, am the defendant in this action, have received
a copy of the summons and complaint and accept service thereof,
and state that I am not now in the Military Service.
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn.




My commission expires September 20, 1953.
3 Omit if no support or alimony is requested.
4 Omit if property settlement is not involved.
0 Complaint virtually the same for separate maintenance, except grounds
are broader (Sec. 25), and relief sought would be separate maintenance and
maintenance instead of divorce and alimony.
4The Grthvlm family, of which Celestine is the oldest daughter, has been



















Plaintiff moves that the Court enter an order granting her
temporary alimony, support for the minor children of the parties,
attorney fees, and court costs, defendant having sufficient income
and property to pay therefor and plaintiff having insufficient


















Plaintiff moves that the Court issue a temporary restraining
order without notice to the defendant on the matters and for the
reasons stated herein.
1. The defendant has committed physical violence against
plaintiff on several occasions.
2. As a result of the bodily violence and abusive treatment
by defendant, plaintiff is in fear both for herself and for their
minor children of further physical violence by defendant.
This could have been filed at any time after the complaint, but in this
instance it was filed at the same time. Notice for hearing is omitted, but it was
served at this time also.
8 Mrs. Hpuiwmn wanted her husband out of the house, and was afraid he
would hide his stocks and bonds. She didn't want him to molest her (even
though she wanted to be free to pick on him at will). So motion for tem-
porary restraining order was filed with her complaint and order obtained the
same day. It could have been done later.
9 If a Bank or other person is to be restrained, join them as parties in the
original complaint; set forth details covering them in Motion.
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3. Plaintiff believes that unless restrained by this Court
defendant will destroy, harm, or otherwise dispose of her posses-
sions in the family home at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado,
and fears that defendant will remove therefrom not only her
possessions but also the family furniture and furnishings now
present therein.
4. Defendant has in his possession or under his control cer-
tain securities, safety deposit boxes, bank accounts, and other
personal property, and also has an interest in a business known
as Hpuiwmn and Uktlus, and plaintiff fears that unless restrained
by this Court defendant will dispose of or place beyond the reach
of this Court said property. 10
5. Defendant could find a place to live elsewhere, but plain-
tiff believes he will refuse to leave the home of the parties unless
ordered by this Court so to do.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves that, until the further order
of this Court:
1. Defendant be restrained from talking to, communicating
with, or otherwise molesting plaintiff, or from interfering, in any
way, with plaintiff's custody of the minor children, Mathilda
Sophronie Hpuiwmn and Alfonso Grthvlm Hpuiwmn.
2. Defendant be restrained from disposing of or removing
any of his property or effects except money for current expenses,
and from entering any safety deposit box in any bank, safe de-
posit company, or depository.
3. Defendant be restrained from destroying, removing, or
injuring any property belonging to the plaintiff, and from de-
stroying, removing, or injuring any household goods, furnishings,
or furniture in the residence of the parties at 11 Waan Avenue,
Denver, Colorado.
4. Defendant be required to remove himself from the family
residence at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado, by 6 p.m. on the
day next following the day he is served with restraining order,
and that he be restrained thereafter from entering, loitering, or









CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERjSS"
1"It is suggested that real estate not be included here; lis pendens can be
recorded and protect any right plaintiff may have therein.
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The undersigned, being duly sworn, says that the facts set
forth in the above motion are true.
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of February,
1952.
Ima DeMopublican
Clerk of the District Court.
By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy Clerk.
ORDER."
The above motion is granted, and the Clerk is hereby ordered
to issue a Temporary Restraining Order to the defendant in the
manner and form as shown on the Temporary Restraining Order
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.










THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO:
To Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, Defendant:
GREETING:
It satisfactorily appearing to the Court, from plaintiff's mo-
tion on file herein, that sufficient grounds exist therefor:
IT IS ORDERED that until the further order of said Court,
you and each of your servants, agents, attorneys, employees, and
all persons acting under the control, authority, or direction of
you, do absolutely refrain from and desist from:
1. Talking to, communicating with, or otherwise molesting
plaintiff, or interfering, in any way, with plaintiff's custody of the
minor children, Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwmn and Alfonso Grthvlm
Hpuiwmn.
11 This order could be attached directly to the motion for temporary re-
straining order.
"It will be noted that his honor, Judge Zedekiah, formerly sat in Division
7, but was transferred to Division 9 when the General Assembly increased the
number of Denver District Judges,
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2. Disposing of or removing any of your property or effects
except money for current expenses, and entering any safety de-
posit box in any bank, safe deposit company, or depository.
13
3. Destroying, removing, or injuring any property belonging
to the plaintiff, and destroying, removing, or injuring any house-
hold goods, furnishings, or furniture in the residence of the parties
at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you will remove yourself
from the family residence at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado,
by 6 p.m. on the day following the day you are served with this
restraining order, and you are restrained thereafter from enter-
ing, loitering or remaining near said premises.
WITNESS the Honorable Zadok Zedekiah, one of the Judges
of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State
of Colorado, with the seal thereof affixed, at my office, in the City
and County of Denver, this 15th day of February, 1952.
Ima DeMopublican
Clerk.
(SEAL) By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERJSS"
I do hereby certify that I delivered to the said defendant a
copy of the within restraining order this 16th day of February,
1952.
Juan F. Mersbuys,
(SEAL) Manager of Safety and Excise and
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City
and County of Denver
By I. Will Ketchum
Deputy Sheriff.
(USE CAPTION) 1
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN, MOTION FOR
Plaintiff, CITATION FOR
vs. CONTEMPT OF
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN, COURT.
: 4
Defendant.
13 If other person is to be restrained, bond must be posted as to such person.
This is not necessary, however, as to parties to the divorce. An additional order
should be entered for each such other person. In the event that any bank or
other depository is to be affected by orders of the divorce Court, such persons
should be named as original parties and brought within the jurisdiction of the
Court.
11 Had the bank been joined as a party and restrained from permitting
Reginald access to the safety box, it probably would not have been necessary




That on February 15, 1952, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court, restraining defendant, among other
things, from talking to, communicating with, or otherwise molest-
ing plaintiff and from disposing of or removing any of his property
or effects and from entering any safety deposit box in any bank.
That defendant was personally served with said temporary
restraining order on February 16, 1952.
That defendant has disobeyed said order in the following
particulars:
1. On February 18, 1952, defendant talked to plaintiff
on the telephone at her residence, 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colo-
rado, from 9:15 to 9:26 P.M.
2. On February 19, 1952, defendant entered his safety de-
posit box at the Second National Bank, Denver, Colorado, and
removed therefrom certain securities.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves that the Court issue an order
to the Clerk to cite and give notice to the said defendant to be
and appear before the Court at a date and time to be stated in
said order, to show cause, if any he has, why he should not be
punished for contempt, for neglect and refusal to comply with the
order of the Court heretofore entered herein, in the particulars
referred to in plaintiff's above motion, and why, to vindicate the








Denver 2, Colorado, DYbryt 004U.
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERISS"
The undersigned being duly sworn, says that the facts set
forth in the above motion are true.
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn













It is hereby ordered that the Clerk issue forthwith a citation
to the defendant, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, to be and appear
before this Court on the 25th day of February, 1952, at the hour
of 9:30 o'clock A.M., to show cause, if any he may have, why he
should not be punished for contempt for neglect and refusal to
comply with the order of the Court heretofore entered herein, in
the particulars referred to in plaintiff's motion for citation for
contempt of Court incorporated herein by reference, and why, to
vindicate the dignity of the Court, a fine or imprisonment should
not be imposed upon him.










THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, TO THE
SHERIFF OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
Greeting:
WHEREAS, In a certain cause in said Court now pending,
wherein Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn is plaintiff, and Reginald
Phinehas Hpuiwmn is defendant, a certain order was entered of
record, whereby defendant was restrained from talking to, com-
municating with, or otherwise molesting plaintiff, and from dis-
posing of, or removing any of his property or effects and from en-
tering any safety deposit box in any bank.
AND, WHEREAS, It appears to the Court that the defendant,
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, has failed to comply with said order
in the particulars referred to in plaintiff's motion, incorporated
herein by reference and attached hereto.
THESE ARE THEREFORE TO COMMAND YOU, That you
cite and give notice to the said defendant, Reginald Phinehas
Hpuiwmn, to be and appear before the Hon. Zadok Zedekiah in
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the 9th Division of this Court on the 25th day of February, 1952,
at the hour of 9:30 o'clock A.M., to show cause, if any he have,
why he should not be punished for contempt, for neglect and re-
fusal to comply with the order of the Court heretofore entered
herein, and why, to vindicate the dignity of the Court, a fine and
imprisonment should not be imposed upon him.
WITNESS, Ima DeMopublican, Clerk of said Court, this 20th
day of February, 1952.
(SEAL) Ima DeMopublican
Clerk.
By Q. D. Istricap
Deputy Clerk.
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERss.
STATE OF COLORADO
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, That I have duly executed the
within writ this 21st day of February, 1952, by handing to and
leaving with Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn a copy of this citation,
together with a copy of motion for citation for contempt of court
and order for citation, at Denver, Colorado.
(SEAL) Juan F. Mersbuys,
Manager of Safety and Excise and
Ex-Officic Sheriff of the City
and County of Denver.
By I. Will Ketchum
Deputy Sheriff.
The Court's order at the contempt hearing is omitted to avoid
the necessity of entering into personalities.
(USE CAPTION)
CELESTINE CORINNA







1. Defendant admits the averments of paragraphs 1, 2, and
5, except as set forth below.
2. Defendant denies the averments of paragraphs 3 and 4,
1 Sec. 7 uses the word "Cross-complaint," but it is believed that Sec. 5 (1)
as amended in 1945 making the Rules applicable to Divorce, etc. controls, and
that the preferred word now is "counterclaim" (Rule 13).
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and that part of 5 averring that the property should be divided
between them.
3. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the averment in paragraph 2 that plaintiff
desires the custody of the children therein named.
SECOND DEFENSE.
1. Plaintiff has been guilty of acts set forth in 1935 C.S.A.,
Chapter 56, Section 1, Third and Seventh, which acts constitute
grounds for defendant to divorce plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff has, by her subsequent conduct, condoned any of
defendant's acts constituting cruelty, which acts defendant denies.
COUNTERCLAIM. 16
1. Same as paragraph 1 of complaint.
2. Same as paragraph 2 of complaint, except that defendant
desires the custody of the children therein named.
3. Plaintiff has been guilty of acts set forth in C.S.A., Chap.
56, Sec. 1, Third and Seventh.
17
4. Same as paragraph 5 of complaint.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff's complaint
be dismissed at plaintiff's costs, for a divorce, custody of the
minor children, a division of property, and for such other and





Actspard, Dimorzgo, Hort, Hrmok,
Lgndah and Pbddson
By F. Lunkeynum Berten
Attorneys for Defendant,
Court House Square Bldg.,
Denver 2, Colorado, ZEckendorf 0008.
Hpuiwmn calmed down, and, rather than face a contest and
possible denial of divorce to both parties (Chap. 56, Sec. 7), he
allowed Celestine to proceed to a non-contested decree. The form
of decree to be used in event of a jury or court trial of a contested
divorce is omitted, because that decree could be similar to any
civil trial verdict and judgment, with findings for or against
each party.
26 Request for jury trial is omitted, but would be identical to that of other
civil actions.
17 Vagueness is sometimes preferred to stating adultry, drunkenness or drug










THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard on this 20th day of
March, 1952, upon its merits, the plaintiff being represented by
Silvester Hasede, attorney of record, and the defendant appearing
by F. Lunkeynum Berten, attorney of record, and the Court having
examined the full record herein, finds that it has jurisdiction
herein; and having heard the evidence and the statements of coun-
sel, the Court now being fully advised;
DOTH FIND that a divorce should be granted to the plain-
tiff herein upon the statutory grounds of extreme and repeated
acts of cruelty; therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court,
that an absolute divorce should be granted to the plaintiff, and an
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce is hereby entered, dissolving the
marriage of plaintiff and defendant six months after the date of
this Interlocutory Decree.
IT IS EXPRESSLY DECREED by the Court that during
such six months period after the signing of this Interlocutory
Decree the parties hereto shall not be divorced; shall still be hus-
band and wife, and neither party shall be competent to contract
another marriage anywhere during such period, and the Court
during all of said period does hereby retain jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter of this cause and upon motion of
either party, or upon its motion, for good cause shown, after a
hearing, may set aside this Interlocutory Decree.
It is Further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the COURT that defendant shall pay into the Registry of the
District Court on the 1st and 15th day of each month, commenc-
ing April 1, 1952, and continuing until further order of this Court,
"The decree herewith submitted is identical to the printed form used by
the Denver District Court. It is believed by the committee, however, that the
following form would be sufficient in most instances:
"THIS MATTER, coming on to be heard:
THE COURT DOTH FIND:
That a divorce should be granted to the plaintiff upon the grounds of ex-
treme and repeated acts of cruelty; therefore, IT IS ORDERED:
That an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce is hereby entered in favor of the
plaintiff, dissolving the marriage of plaintiff and defendant six months after
the date of this Interlocutory Decree.
The Court FURTHER DECREES that after six months from the date
hereof this Interlocutory Decree shall be and become a Final Decree of Divorce
and the parties shall then be divorced, unless this Interlocutory Decree shall
have been set aside, or an appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been
issued.
Done in open Court this 20th day of March, 1952."
DICTA
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the sum of $100.00, payable $50.00 to plaintiff for temporary ali-
mony and $25.00 to plaintiff for the support of each child, and
also, on or before March 25, 1952, defendant shall pay into the
Registry of the District Court the sum of $163.00, payable $13.00
to plaintiff for her Court costs to date and $150.00 to plaintiff
on account of plaintiff's attorney fees, which $150.00 plaintiff
has assigned to her attorney Silvester Hasede, and which the Clerk
is to pay directly to said attorney.1
It is Further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the Court that the sole care, custody and control of the minor
children, Mathilda Sophronia Hpuiwrmn and Alfonso Grtholm
Hpuiwmn, is hereby awarded to the plaintiff as a suitable person
to have such care and custody until the further order of the
Court, with the defendant to have reasonable visitation rights.
2"
The Court FURTHER DECREES that after six months from
the date hereof this Interlocutory Decree shall be and become a
Final Decree of Divorce and the parties shall then be divorced,
unless this Interlocutory Decree shall have been set aside, or an
appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been issued.




APPROVED AS TO FORM:
F. Lunkeynum Berten,
Attorney for Defendant.
I" In this case, the parties had not arrived at a settlement. Calling it "tem-
porary alimony" looks like no settlement. If there were an agreement and the
parties wanted part or all of it enforceable by the Court in this same action,
the entire agreement or pertinent portions could be extracted or paraphrased
and included as part of the Court order at this stage in the decree, being sure
that the order included as a preface a remark such as: "The Court finds that
the parties have arrived at an agreement as to alimony, support, division of
property, and other matters, which agreement has been admitted into evidence
as exhibit "A" and which is approved by the Court, and the parties are hereby
ordered to carry out the following provisions thereof: Then set out the en-
tire agreement or the portions desired in the order, but don't do it just by
reference. Spell it out in the body of the decree.
Sometimes, even where there is an agreement, the parties do not want
it put in the decree for income tax reasons, desire to avoid later modification
or enlargement, keeping it off record, etc.
2"It is hoped the Hpuiwmns are able to work this out. If not, the Court
later will have to spell out in detail when the father can see the children,
whether or not he can take 'them out of the house, who will feed them, and





vs. IN DIVORCE 21
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
On this day, it appearing to the Court that an Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce was entered herein on the 20th day of March,
1952, which decreed that six (6) months after the entry of the
said Interlocutory Decree, it shall be and become a Final Decree
of Divorce, unless such Interlocutory Decree has been duly set
aside, or an appeal has been taken, or a writ of error has been
issued.
And it further appearing to the Court that no appeal has
been taken and no writ of error has been issued by the Supreme
Court, and that the said Interlocutory Decree has not been set
aside:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court,
that more than six (6) months' time has elapsed since the entry
of said Interlocutory Decree, and that said Interlocutory Decree
has become and now is a Final Decree of Divorce, made and en-
tered upon the terms and conditions contained in the Interlocu-
tory Decree, or any modification or change thereof subsequently
made by the Court .
2
2




When the decree became final, Mrs. Hpuiwmn moved for
permanent alimony, support, division of property, and, at their
insistence, for attorney fees. We omit the form of the motion,
but include the order entered:
' Some courts require a motion for final decree which could be substan-
tially as follows: "Plaintiff moves for entry of final decree in accordance with
the terms of the interlocutory decree entered herein on March 20, 1952." Other
courts enter the final decree as a matter of course. It will be noted that in
Hpuiwmn v. Hpuiwmn, no action was taken by the parties during the six
months' period to alter the provisions of the interlocutory decree.
2 The Hpuiwmns had not agreed on final settlement. Had they done so,
part or all of their agreement could have been made a part of the final decree,





HPUIWMN, ORDER FOR ALIMONY,
Plaintiff, SUPPORT, DIVISION OF






THIS MATTER having come on to be heard this 29th day
of September, 1952:
THE COURT DOTH FIND:
1. That Final Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter
September 21, 1952.
2. That at this date both parties are in good bodily health.
3. That plaintiff is not and never has been employed and
has no income and defendant during the past year has drawn
an average of $425.00 a month from the partnership business of
Hpuiwmn and Uktlus.
4. That the parties at this time own the following property:
The residence in which plaintiff and the two children
live at 11 Waan Avenue, Denver, Colorado, legally de-
scribed as Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Dousthul Heights, City
and County of Denver, of a current market value of
$10,000.00, encumbered by a deed of trust securing a note
in the present balance of $2,500.00, payable to the Only
State Bank of Montclair, on which payments in the
amount of $40.00 a month (including interest, taxes and
insurance) are due on the first of each month. This prop-
erty was purchased December 1, 1951, and the purchase
money was contributed one-half by plaintiff's and one-
half by defendant's family as a Christmas gift to the
two of them. Title is held in joint tenancy.
500 Shares of Denargo Oil Co. of Toronto, common
stock of a value of $500.00, purchased in August of 1951
with funds from the former joint bank account of the
parties.
A joint Savings Account in the 2nd National Bank
of Denver, balance of $242.00 representing gifts from
the family of each.
Defendant's checking account in the same bank, bal-
ance of $319.00.
Plaintiff's checking account in the same bank, bal-
ance of $28.00.
It is recognized that because this order is based almost completely on the
peculiarity of the particular facts, it will vary greatly in each case.
DICTA
Mar., 1952
A 1946 Chevrolet Club Coupe, property of defend-
ant before marriage, with title now in plaintiff's name,
needed by defendant in his business and by the plain-
tiff to assist in caring for the children, of a current
market value of $700.00.
An interest in the above partnership business, at a
book value of $9,726.41, built up from a $50.00 invest-
ment from a joint checking account in February of 1949.
Both plaintiff and defendant are listed as partners, in
the same amount, but defendant devotes full time to it
and plaintiff has never been active. The other partners
will approve an assignment of plaintiff's interest to de-
fendant, but will dissolve the partnership if plaintiff is
to remain a partner.
6--$100.00 maturity value Co-ownership U. S. Sav-
ings Bonds of a redemption value of $450.00, purchased
from funds from a joint checking account in November,
1951.
$10,000.00 straight life policy with the NMYRON
Insurance Company and $10,000.00 straight life policy
with National Service Life Insurance Company, on de-
fendant's life, on which yearly premiums of $225.00 and
$114.00 respectively are payable in June of each year,
and on which plaintiff is primary and the children named
in the complaint herein are secondary beneficiaries.
6. That at this time there are, in addition to the note and
deed of trust in the house, unpaid bills for personal family ex-
penses of the parties incurred before this action was instituted
in a total amount of $56.00, as shown by Plaintiff's Exhibits
"D1,"p "E,"p "F," and "G."
7. That plaintiff's attorney has performed serv:ce3 for plain-
tiff of a reasonable value of $250.00, of which amount $150.00
has been paid pursuant to previous order, leaving an unpaid bal-
ance of $100.00; it has been stipulated that the amount found
due, if any, from defendant to plaintiff for plaintiff's attorney
fees shall be paid directly to said attorney and not to plaintiff.
8. That $200.00 per month is a reasonable sum for the sup-
port of plaintiff and of the children named in the complaint,
inclusive of payments on the note to the Only State Bank of
Montclair.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. That defendant shall pay into the Registry of the Dis-
trict Court, on the 1st and 15th of each month, commencing Octo-
ber 1, 1952, and continuing until further order of this Court,
the sum of $100.00, payable $50.00 to plaintiff for alimony and
$25.00 to plaintiff for the support of each child.
2. That defendant shall pay unto said Registry, on or before
DICTA
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October 10, 1952, the sum of $100.00, payable to Silvester Hasede,
in full the balance of plaintiff's attorney fees.
3. That defendant shall, on or before October 10, 1952, pay
the $56.00 in outstanding bills above referred to and file receipts
therefor with the Clerk of the District Court.
4. That the real property herein involved shall be disposed
of by separate order entered herein.
2 4
5. That Defendant is the owner of both plaintiff's and de-
fendant's interest in the partnership business, Hpuiwmn and
Uktlus, and plaintiff will execute the necessary instruments to
assign to defendant whatever interest she may hold. Defendant
shall reimburse plaintiff for any income tax liability there may
be in plaintiff in connection with her previous position as a part-
ner in said business.
6. That the remaining property of the parties shall be divided
as follows:
(a) Each party is the owner of his or her individual
checking account.
(b) The Chevrolet automobile is the property of the
defendant.
(c) Plaintiff is the owner of the Denargo Oil Com-
pany of Toronto common stock and of the joint savings
account in the 2nd National Bank of Denver.
(d) Each party is the owner of three (3) of the
$100.00 U. S. Savings Bonds.
7. That Defendant shall maintain in full force and effect
and free of any liens and encumbrances the life insurance policy
with the NMYRON Insurance Company, paying the premiums
as they fall due, with plaintiff as the primary beneficiary on
$5,000.00, and each child on $2,500.00 thereof, with the children
as secondary beneficiaries on all of said insurance. In event of
plaintiff's death or remarriage before defendant's death, defendant
may substitute the children as primary beneficiaries on plain-
tiff's $5,000.00. As each child attains the age of 21, defendant
may delete said child as a beneficiary. Present mode of settle-
ment will be altered to provide for lump sum settlement on the
death of the insured. The policy will be deposited with the Clerk
of the District Court, and the premium receipts will be similarly
deposited as received.
The other policy is the property of defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motion for new trial is
dispensed with, and 60 days is allowed to either party for Re-
porter's Transcript.




14 Separate order is used to dispose of the real property to prevent the








Denver 2, Colorado-DYbryt 004U.
Actspard, Dimorzzo, Hort, Hrmok, Lgndah and Pbddson,
By F. Lunkeynum Berten,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Court House Square Building,
Denver 2, Colorado-ZEckendorf 0008.
(USE CAPTION) 1
CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN, ORDER FOR
Plaintiff, DISTRIBUTION OF
vs. { REAL PROPERTY
REGINALD PHINEHAS HPUIWMN,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on to be heard this 29th day
of September, 1952:
THE COURT DOTH ORDER:
That Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn is the owner of Lots 1 and
2, Block 1, Dousthul Heights, in the City and County of Denver,
State of Colorado, subject to encumbrances of record, and that
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn has no right, title, or interest in or
to the said property. 25
That Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn make all payments on the
existing promissory note to the Only State Bank of Montclair,
secured by Deed of Trust encumbering said real property,26 and
that said Deed of Trust shall be released before said Celestine
Corinna Hpuiwmn convey her interest in said real property.




2 Although it is customary for a divorce decree to direct one of the parties
to convey to the other, or, if he fails to so convey, to appoint a commissioner
to act in his stead, it will be noted that the form herewith submitted omits
such conveyance. Authority for such procedure may be found in Sec. 279,
Patton on Titles, where, among other things, it is said: "The effect of such a
decree is in all respects equivalent to a deed executed by the party whom the
decree divests of title and in favor of the party thereby invested, except that the
latter takes title subject to the contingency of is revesting in case of a reversal
of the decree."
Sec. 8, Ch. 56, 1935 C.S.A., provides: . . . when a divorce has been granted
the court ... may decree a division of property . .
See: 84 Colo. 429, 73 Colo. 337, 74 Colo. 231.
See also: 176 P. (2) 363, 148 P. (2) 369, 76 ALR 296, 64 ALR 1392, 124
U. S. 74 (31 L. Ed. 344), 108 N. E. 796, 144 N. W. 139.
"Because his interest in the real estate is extinguished, the defendant is
protected, as a matter of law, from the plaintiff's non-payment, by his right
to bid at any foreclosure sale.
DICTA
